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ABSTRACT 
 
This study examines the extent to which religious socials norms of the firm’s environment 
would affect classification shifting and whether such impact would be altered in the presence 
of firm specific corporate governance characteristics, such as board independence and BIG4 
audit. Using a sample of 23,164 U.S. firm-year observations between 2000 and 2015, we find 
that managers would be deterred to shift revenue items and core expenses from/into special 
items so as to inflate core earnings in a religious social norm’s environment. The religion 
through the ethical channel would act as a deterrent to unethical managerial behaviour such as 
classification shifting. We also show that the religion would complement corporate governance 
and auditor characteristics to mitigate classification shifting.  We report results with some 
variability as we examine the ethical role of religion in reducing classification shifting in rural 
vs urban areas, in low vs high religious areas, as well as in pre and post financial crisis periods. 
Finally, we show that regulation also plays a role as the SOX Act (2002) appears to curb 
opportunistic managerial behaviour, even more so in a religious social norm’s environment.  
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1. INTRODUCTION  
 
The objective of this study is to provide an empirical assessment of the extent to which religious 
social norms of the firms' environment would affect misclassification of income-decreasing 
special items or special revenue items so as to impact upon reported core earnings. To this day, 
the literature is agnostic on the impact of religion on classification shifting. Prior research (see 
Conroy and Emerson 2004; McGuire et al., 2012; Dyreng et al., 2012; and Hilary and Hui, 
2009; Callen et al., 2011) focuses on the impact of religiosity on financial misreporting, and it 
reports that the former would act as a deterrent to the latter. The impact of religion on business 
ethics (Weaver and Agle, 2002; Longenecker, et al., 2004; Vitell 2009; Cai and Shi, 2017), on 
credit ratings (Cai and Shi, 2017), on audit (Leventis, et al. 2015) and on tax avoidance (Boone, 
et al. 2013) has also been explored. However, the impact of religion on classification shifting 
remains to a large extent unexplored. We fill this gap in the literature and examine managers’ 
opportunistic misclassification of revenue and/or expense items in a religious social norm 
environment, also in the presence of certain corporate governance and BIG4 audit practices. 
This is of some importance because firms may be tempted to believe that unethical 
classificatory behaviour does not need much consideration since it is an accounting practice 
within the law. Regrettably, as classification shifting through window dressing type of 
manipulation might boost revenue in the short-term and conceal costs (Arel et al., 2012), it 
could uphold the true information set and in a ‘cherry picking’ manner would reveal instead 
what unethical business managers would favour to reveal.   
 
There are numerous studies on classification shifting (Zalata and Roberts, 2017; Fan et al.  
2010; McVay, 2006) that argue that misclassifying core expenses or revenue items into special 
items aims at influencing perceptions of the firms’ performance in an unethical manner (Zalata 
and Roberts, 2017, Fan et al., 2010). As classification shifting is often disguised as a standard 
accounting practice and may involve a plethora of accounting items in financial statements, 
while it is within the boundaries of most regulatory accounting frameworks, it is rather hard to 
detect in practice.1 Yet, despite the challenges to detect classification shifting, it is of 
                                                 
1 Misclassification in expense items (cost of goods sold, selling, general and administrative expenses) is reported 
in Zalata and Roberts, (2016) and (2017), Behn, et al. (2013) and Haw, et al. (2011). Managers might also 
misclassify expenses in discontinued operations as operating expenses (Barua, Lin and Sbaraglia, 2010) and shift 
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importance to study given its popularity among practitioners in recent years, also in light of 
ethical concerns about its use (Zalata and Roberts 2017 and 2016).  In fact, Zalata and Roberts 
(2017) strongly argue that classification shifting is not ethical. In this paper, we explore this 
channel of classification shifting that we call the ethical channel. In particular, we build on 
previous studies that show an association between religion and business ethics (Weaver and 
Agle, 2002; Longenecker, et al., 2004; Conroy and Emerson, 2004; Vitell 2009; Cai and Shi, 
2017). This strand of research reasons that religion would improve business ethics. Yet, the 
role of religion in relation to deviations from widely accepted ethical behaviour at firm level 
has not been given the due attention. However, such deviations may lead to high debt levels or 
even to catastrophic business failure (Longenecker, et al., 2004; Vitell 2009; Cai and Shi, 
2017). Alas, in the case of a business failure a close scrutiny of the underlying firm’s ethical 
behaviour either comes late or comes ex post the event of the failure (Schwartz, 2016; Kaplan 
et al., 2009; Staubus, 2005). In a recent paper, Baiada-Hireche and Garmilis (2016) indicate 
that long-term successful business practices are associated with sound ethical behaviour at firm 
level. Of course, it is not without challenges to identify business ethics at firm level. We reason 
that classification shifting would provide a way of identifying unethical behavior at firm level 
in a timely manner, thereby allowing us to examine the impact of religion on the former through 
the ethical channel.  
 
To this end, a careful examination, for example, of shifting core expenses to boost reported 
core earnings would reveal deviations from ethical behaviour at firm level. Having identified 
classification shifting at firm level as unethical accounting practice, we would consider, 
thereafter, what would be the impact of religion on classification shifting. It might be the case 
that  religion could be of importance for classification shifting and thereby for business ethics 
at firm level. For example, it could be the case that religion would reduce classification shifting 
by strengthening the information content of financial statements and by enhancing, thereby, 
business ethics. In addition, as classification shifting could be related to corporate governance 
and audit practices, we propose also to examine whether the interaction between religion, 
                                                 
extraordinary items into operating expense to inflate core earnings. Malikov, et al. (2017), Noh, et al. (2017) refer 
to misclassification of other income or revenues from non-operating activities as operating revenues to influence 
market perceptions, influence share price or beat analysts’ benchmarks. 
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corporate governance and auditor characteristics would influence misclassification of core 
expenses and/or revenue.  
 
Measuring religion has its own challenges. Most studies opt for the definition of religion as 
reported by Religious Congregations and Membership Study (RCMS), which provides a 
religiosity index that measures the strength of religious social norms.2 The Association of 
Religion Data Archive (ARDA) provides data for religiosity index for U.S. Counties.  Herein, 
we follow the definition by Religious Congregations and Membership Study (RCMS), which 
is the norm in the literature (McGuire et al., 2012; Dyreng et al, 2012; Hilary and Hui, 2009). 
Having identified religiosity in U.S., we opt for McVay (2006) expectation model to assess the 
existence of classification shifting in the U.S..3 Our sample covers every state in the U.S. and 
employs all county-level religious dataset.  
 
This paper contributes to the literature in several ways: firstly, we are the first to measure the 
impact of religion on classification shifting. Secondly, we include individual and interactive 
terms between religiosity and corporate governance variables. Thirdly, we examine the 
association between religiosity and auditor tenure as well as religiosity and BIG4 auditors (see 
Zalata and Roberts, 2016), by including both individual and interaction terms. Such interactions 
might be of importance. Fourth, we examine at a robustness stage whether our findings hold 
using different definitions for religiosity and various measures of unexpected core earnings. 
We also examine as part of robustness test whether the regulatory framework such as the 
Sarbanes–Oxley (SOX) Act 2002 and the financial crisis would impact upon the effect of 
religiosity on classification shifting.  
                                                 
2 The term religiosity describes religious adherents in a county which consist of all members, full members, 
communicants or non- communicants, baptized or non-baptized, regular attendants, participants of weekly 
religious activities and those who consider religion as important part of their life (see Religious Congregations 
and Membership Study (RCMS), 2010).   
 
3 We ensure at this stage that any association found between religiosity and classification shifting would be tested 
against previous criticism. So, following Fan et al. (2010) we exclude contemporaneous accruals from the original 
McVay (2006) model. We respond to the call by Callen et al., (2011) and McGuire et al., (2012) to examine the 
extent to which religion affects earnings management on a broader scale by exploring the association between 
religiosity and misclassification of special items. We also replace total accruals by working capital accruals (which 
exclude depreciation expense and other exceptional items) to avoid any bias associated with original McVay’s 
(2006) model as reported by Athanasakou, et al.  (2009). In addition, we examine the geographical dispersion, 
high and low religious areas, rural and urban areas. 
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We find a significant negative association between religious social norms and classification 
shifting, suggesting that in a religious social norms environment, managers’ incentive to 
classification shifting is subdued. Our evidence shows that the religion through the ethical 
channel acts as a deterrent to unethical managerial behaviour such as classification shifting. 
We also observe that religion is negatively related to classification shifting in firms located in 
both rural and urban areas in the light of the low (high) earnings quality often associated with 
urban (rural) firms respectively. We interact religiosity and corporate governance variables, 
auditor tenure, BIG4 auditors and find that in a religious social norms environment, the effect 
of corporate governance, auditor tenure and BIG4 auditor on classification shifting is more 
pronounced and carries a negative sign. Thus, religiosity complements corporate governance, 
auditor tenure and BIG4 auditors to mitigate managers’ incentives to misclassify special 
revenue items or core expenses so as to inflate the reported core earnings. In further analysis, 
we show that religiosity impacts upon firms in geographic centralised areas, pre and post 
financial crisis period, complements the SOX Act (2002) to curb opportunistic managerial 
misclassification behaviour, and serves as a monitoring mechanism to complement existing 
governance structures and external monitoring. 
 
The rest of the study is organised as follows. In section 2, we discuss the literature and develop 
the hypotheses. Section 3 covers research design, empirical methodology and estimation 
equations. Section 4 discusses data collection, sampling and descriptive statistics. The 
regression results are discussed in section 5. Section 6 presents results of robustness tests and 
further sensitivity analyses. Lastly, section 7 provides conclusion and future research. 
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
 
2.1 Classification Shifting and Religious Social Norms  
Social norm theory posits that managers who work in an environment with diverse social norms 
exhibit varied behaviours (Tayler and Bloomfield, 2010). Individuals’ decisions are shaped and 
influenced by the moral values and social norms of the environment where they live or work. 
The role of religion on business ethics literature (Conroy and Emerson, 2004; Longenecker et 
al., 2004) indicate that providing misleading financial information is ethically and morally 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 7 
unacceptable. For instance, prior research has established relationship between religion and 
personal behaviour (Lehrer, 2004, p. 180), religion and development (Mersland, D’Espallier 
and Supphellen, 2012), religion, economic attitudes and household income (Renneboog and 
Spaenjers, 2011). Previous researchers have also indicated that religion affects individuals’ 
behaviour and that religiosity enhances individual’s ethical values and attitudes (Tayler and 
Bloomfield, 2010; Vitell, 2009). This view is also corroborated by Parboteeah, Hoegl and 
Cullen (2008) who find that individual’s level of religiosity is positively correlated with high 
ethical values. Sunder (2005) underscores the importance of religious values to the stakeholders 
of the firm and finds that the absence of religiosity can potentially harm stakeholders and affect 
the whole system and performance of the organisation.  
 
There is a plethora of studies (McVay 2006; Fan et al., 2010; Haw et al. 2011; Behn et al., 
2013; Zalata and Robert, 2017 and 2016) that show evidence of classification shifting whilst 
there is no study that links religion with classification shifting. Moreover, we know the 
importance of classification shifting from the literature (McVay 2006; Fan et al., 2010; Zalata 
and Robert, 2017 and 2016). There is evidence that earnings management in terms of accruals 
management involves borrowing earnings from future periods either through acceleration of 
revenues or delaying of expenses (Donelson, Mcinnis & Mergenthaler, 2013; Gerakos and 
Kovrijnykh, 2013). On the other hand, real-activities management involves the provision of 
discounts to boost sales and cutting down of discretionary expenses such as advertising and 
research and development costs so as to increase reported earnings (Wongsunwai, 2013). 
However, classification shifting is rather complicated and harder to detect as it involves 
classifying operating expenses as discontinued operations (Barua et al., 2010), classifying 
operating expenses as extraordinary, classifying operating expenses as special items (McVay, 
2006) and classifying other operating income as special items (Noh et al, 2017).  McVay (2006) 
indicates that classification shifting re-arranges income statement items and does not change 
the bottom-line reported earnings. Zalata and Robert, (2017, 2016) and Fan et al., (2010) 
indicate that all methods of earnings management raise expectations of future performance but 
real-activities and accrual-based earnings management have the effect of reducing future or 
past earnings. This leads to a compromise in reputation and the quality of financial reporting. 
With income-decreasing classification shifting, McVay (2006) indicates that core earnings are 
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inflated as recurring items are shifted to non-recurring and exceptional items, leading to a 
positive relationship between core earnings and special items. Therefore, as there is no 
implication for future reported earnings, there is limited external monitoring and vigilance from 
auditors.   
 
Our contribution to the above discussion posits that religiosity in a firm’s environment could 
complement existing managerial monitoring mechanism to mitigate unethical misclassification 
behaviour. Previous studies that have established the association between religion and earnings 
management (McGuire et al., 2012; Dyreng et al, 2012; Hilary and Hui, 2009) ignore 
classification shifting as an earnings management method. We fill this gap in the earnings 
management literature and argue that this is of importance because of the underlying 
characteristics of classification shifting. Note that classification shifting does not involve 
GAAP violation as it does not change bottom-line or future profits. To this end, it might be 
lawful, but it is not ethical. Given that it is not a GAAP violation, auditors and regulators also 
do not scrutinize classification shifting as they do for accrual-based and real-activities earnings 
management (Fan et al., 2010; McVay, 2006).  There is some evidence that religion could 
mitigate accrual earnings management as clearly this practice is not within the law (Fan et al., 
2010; McVay, 2006). A question that emerges is whether religious social norms would have a 
mitigation impact on unethical accounting practices that do not involve either law or violate 
GAAP regulations. Given that such an accounting practice is clearly not right from an ethical 
point of view. This discussion postulates the following hypothesis:  
 
H1: The religiosity of the firms’ environment would mitigate classification shifting. 
 
2.2 Classification Shifting, Religiosity and Corporate Governance 
 
Zalata and Roberts (2016) observe that high quality internal governance in the board and audit 
committees mitigate classification shifting. Li Lin and Hwang (2010) indicate that strong 
corporate governance acts as a form of monitoring mechanism, controls devious managerial 
behaviour, moderates classification shifting and reduces information risk. Given this evidence, 
it is of interest to further investigate the impact of religion on classification shifting in the 
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presence of specific corporate governance structures. It could be the case that there are 
complexities to be revealed when it comes to the impact of religion on classification shifting, 
as the former could affect the latter through an indirect channel. If such indirect channel exists, 
it could be revealed by including interactions between religion and corporate governance 
variables. Therefore, we shall investigate the impact of interaction between corporate 
governance, defined as presence of audit committee, strong board size and independent board, 
and religiosity of the firms’ environment on classification shifting.  
 
The interaction between corporate governance and religion could amplify the effect of the latter 
on classification shifting as underlying synergies might be at play. Previous research (see Ho, 
2010) argues that religiosity is a significant cultural value that would influence the ethical 
perception of the managers. Therefore, one would expect that strong governance would 
enhance the effect of religiosity on the ethical behaviour of the organization. Herein, we further 
examine the role of an independent board. Such board could act at a higher level of religiosity 
and thereby enact a more ethical tone for the business that, in turn, would further moderate 
classification shifting. But this is a testable hypothesis that is subject to testing.  Following the 
above, we test for the following hypothesis:  
 
H2: The interactions between religiosity and corporate governance would mitigate 
classification shifting.   
 
2.3 Classification Shifting, Religiosity and Auditor Characteristics 
 
Several studies (Haw et al., 2011; Francis and Yu, 2009) show that auditor characteristics could 
complement existing corporate governance mechanisms and reduce accruals earnings 
management.  Empirical evidence indicates that Big4 auditors would lower the magnitude of 
discretionary accruals (Choi et al., 2012; Asthana and Boone, 2012; Francis and Wong, 2008). 
Eshleman and Guo (2014) argue that Big4 auditors have better training programmes and 
provide higher audit quality due to their size. Furthermore, Haw et al. (2011) find that 
classification shifting decreases when firms are audited by the Big4 in East Asia whilst external 
auditors with short tenures are associated with lower earnings quality. On the other hand, 
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Hohenfels (2016) observe that longer auditor tenure impairs auditor independence and lowers 
audit quality. Similarly, Francis and Wong (2008) observe that auditor tenure negatively affects 
audit quality, earnings management, lawsuit against auditors and investors’ confidence.4   
 
Despite the reported mixed findings of the impact of auditor tenure, further complexities exist 
as Behn et al., (2013) and Fan et al., (2010) argue that auditors and regulators might scrutinise 
less classification shifting activities, because misclassification does not change GAAP 
earnings. If this is indeed the case, then business ethics might be at risk.  
 
We focus on a missing link in the literature by examining whether auditor characteristics could 
interact with religious social norms of the firms’ environment and whether such interactions 
have an impact on misclassification. Given that religion is found to positively affect business 
ethics (see Weaver and Agle, 2002; Longenecker, McKinney and Moore, 2004), it could be the 
case that religion could interact with auditor characteristics and mitigate classification shifting 
through its support for ethical behaviour. To this end, in the empirical application, we consider 
how auditors in Big4 and auditors with tenure interact with religion and thereby their effect on 
classification shifting.5 The following hypothesis is formulated for testing: 
 
H3: The interaction between religion and auditor characteristics would mitigate classification 
shifting.  
 
3. DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
 
3.1 Measuring Religiosity  
We utilise religious dataset published by Religious Congregations and Membership Study 
(RCMS) to measure the strength of religious social norms. We use these datasets to create our 
proxy for religiosity. The religiosity dataset is derived from Association of Statisticians of 
American Religious Bodies (ASARB). The results of these surveys are published on the 
website of Association of Religion Data Archive (ARDA). The survey consists of an average 
                                                 
4 On the contrary, Kwon et al., (2014) and Davis et al., (2009) find that auditor tenure provides incentives for 
firms to engage in accruals management to either beat or meet analyst forecast. 
5 In this study, the term Big 4 refers to the Big 5 or Big 4 accounting firms in line with studies by Eshleman and 
Guo, (2014). 
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of 173 religious’ bodies6 and a total of 248,957 congregations with an average of 150,686,156 
adherents. This represents 51.9% of the average U.S. population during the period between 
2000 and 2010. The average percentage of population showing religiosity and religious 
adherents from each U.S. County is 64.4% and respondents exceeded 55.9% of the total 
population from each U.S. County. Religious adherents consist of all members, full members, 
communicants or non- communicants, baptized or non-baptized, regular attendants, 
participants of weekly religious activities and those who consider religion as important part of 
their life.  
 
The data set is then scaled by the total county population as reported by U.S. Census Bureau 
of that same period. Conceptually, the higher the percentage of religious adherents in a county, 
the higher the impact of religious social norm on the firms headquartered in that county. 
Therefore, we use total number of religious adherents per capita in line with prior studies 
(McGuire et al. 2012).  Overall, we identify 698 distinctive counties that are the headquarters 
of at least one of the firms on the Compustat annual database used in our analyses between 
2000 and 2015. The county-level religiosity scores are matched to their respective U.S. States 
by merging them by year using the state code identifiers from the Compustat’s company 
location code where firms are headquartered to derive the State-level religious dataset. We use 
religious dataset covering all U.S. States. The data requirement for each dependent and 
independent variable is a function of the number of observations and test required for the 
analysis.  
 
Table 1 below provides descriptive statistics for the measure of RELIGIOSITY (REL). Table 
1 shows that religiosity in the U.S. is declining from an average of approximately 53% in 2000 
to an average of 48% in 2010 in each county. This is consistent with the 2008 American 
Religious Identification Survey, which reports a substantial decline in religiosity among U.S. 
population between 1990 and 2008. Table 1 indicates that approximately 54% of all people in 
                                                 
6 Of this, there were on average 154 Christian denominations and associations (including Messianic Jews, Latter-
Day Saints, and Universalist groups); there were also counts of Shinto, Sikh, Jain, National Spiritualist 
Association Congregations, and several congregations and adherents from three Buddhist groupings, four Hindu 
groupings, Baha’s, four Jewish groupings, Zoroastrians and Muslims. 
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each U.S. county are affiliated with a religion, attend a religious activity or considers religion 
as important in their life. 
(Insert Table 1 Here) 
 
In the robustness analysis, we use Gallup religious database for the twenty most and least 
religious U.S. States for the same period. Based on the responses collected by Gallup, on 
whether religion is important, respondents attend religious activities weekly or are affiliated 
with religion, Mississippi came out, as the most religious state, whilst Vermont is the least 
religious state. The most religious states are mainly in the South, with the exception of Utah, 
while the least religious states are concentrated in New England and the West. 
(Insert Table 2 here) 
 
 
3.2 Control Variables  
 
In line with prior research (Fan et al., 2010), we include lagged core earnings (𝐶𝐸𝑡−1) because 
of the unrelenting nature of core earnings. Following Nassim and Penman (2001), we include 
asset turnover ratio (𝐴𝑇𝑂𝑡) so as to consider the negative association between profit margin 
and 𝐴𝑇𝑂𝑡. McVay (2006) indicates that inclusion of 𝐴𝑇𝑂𝑡  is crucial because changes to the 
operating strategies are associated with firms that have large income-decreasing special items. 
For example, firms can change their profit and sales mix to affect the level of core earnings. 
Previous studies (Fan et al., 2010) observe that earnings performance of firms is influenced by 
accruals and cash flows earnings components. They observe that accruals manipulation could 
result in high or low accruals figure, which can affect firm’s performance. Therefore, we 
include lagged by one year operating accruals (𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑈𝐴𝐿𝑆𝑡−1)  and 𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑈𝐴𝐿𝑆𝑡 at current 
year in the model. We also include the change in sales (∆𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑡) and the percentage change 
in sales (𝑁𝐸𝐺∆𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑡), if ∆𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑡 is less than 0, otherwise zero.  
 
In addition, we include the return on assets (ROA). Cohen and Zarowin (2010) observe that 
firm performance influences earnings management and the poorer the performance of the firm, 
the higher the misclassification of special items to increase reported core earnings. Thus, we 
anticipate a negative coefficient on ROA. We consider the impact of firm size (SIZE) to control 
for the existing variations in accruals behaviour between large and small firms. Prior studies 
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(Ashbaugh et al., 2006) indicate that small firms are more likely to engage in earnings 
manipulations than large firms. Therefore, depending on the size of the firms in the sample, we 
expect a negative or positive association between classification shifting and SIZE. To secure 
external financing, prior studies indicate that management might manage reported earnings 
upwards. We control for this by including the leverage (LEV), estimated as the ratio of long-
term debt to total assets. Badertscher (2011) reports that firms with leverage are likely to 
manage earnings to meet debts covenants. When firms are engaged in misclassification, a 
positive relationship between LEV and unexpected core earnings is expected. Finally, 
consistent with McGuire et al., (2012), we control for population, income levels, education 
level, age, proportion of minority and political affiliations in the counties and states to avoid 
the results being driven by geographic or demographic differences.  
3.3 Data, Sample Selection and Descriptive Statistics 
 
We collect financial data from the annual Compustat database between 2000 and 2015. We 
also obtain additional data from other sources including, Annual Reports, Audit Analytics, 
CRSP and I/B/E/S. Firms with missing data and those with less than 15 firm-year observations 
are excluded in line with prior research (Haw et al., 2011). To shun bias and avoid creation of 
outliers resulting from the inclusion of insignificant firms in the sample, we exclude any 
observation with sales revenue less than $1,000,000 (Fan et al., 2010; McVay, 2006) as sales 
is used as a deflator for the majority of the variables. Utilities firms and financial services 
companies have different reporting environment and regulations; therefore, we do not include 
them in our sample in line with prior studies (Fan et al., 2010). We classify industries using 
Fama and French (1997) industry classification code. Our final sample includes 23,164 firm-
year observations. This final sample is used to estimate the normal or expected core earnings. 
(Insert Table 3 here) 
 
Table 3 above presents descriptive statistics for our regression variables for all firms. The 
mean, median, standard deviation, first quartile and third quartile are reported. The dependent 
variable UNEXP_CE has a mean of 0.002 (approximately zero). The median of UNEXP_CE 
is 0.001 with a standard deviation 0.069. The mean SPITEM is positive (0.002) indicating 
income-decreasing special items. The mean and median of income-increasing special items are 
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positive 0.021 and 0.011 respectively. Also, the mean (median) REL×SPITEM and 
REL×REVT, indicating the interaction between religiosity (REL) and income-decreasing 
special items (SPITEM) and religiosity and special revenue are approximately zero. The other 
distributions are similar and consistent with prior research (Fan et al, 2010). For example, the 
mean and median board size is approximately 11 and ranges between 10 and 11, which is 
consistent with prior studies (Haw et al., 2011; Lipton and Lorsch, 1992). The mean board 
independence shows a slight surge to an approximately 67% consistent with prior studies in 
the U.S. (Abbot et al., 2003 reported 61%; Frankel et al., 2011 reported 66 %). Similarly, audit 
committee size is in line with prior studies in the U.S. (Mangena and Pike, 2005). All other 
univariate statistics and distributions for all variables appear similar to McVay (2006) and Fan 
et al. (2010).  
 
4. RESEARCH DESIGN AND EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGY 
 
4.1 Unexpected Core Earnings and Classification Shifting  
 
To estimate classification shifting, firstly, we focus on the allocation of expenses between core 
expenses and special items. Secondly, we focus on misclassification of special revenue items 
into total revenue to increase reported core earnings. If classification shifting takes place, then 
core expenses or revenue items are misclassified so as to overstate core earnings. We employ 
the McVay’s (2006) and Athanasakou et al. (2009) expectation model that take the following 
form: 
 
𝑁𝑂𝑅_𝐶𝐸𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐶𝐸𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝐴𝑇𝑂𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑈𝐴𝐿𝑆𝑡−1 + 𝛽4𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑈𝐴𝐿𝑆𝑡
+ 𝛽5∆𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑁𝐸𝐺_∆𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡  ,                          
 
(1) 
  
where 𝑁𝑂𝑅_𝐶𝐸𝑡 is the core earnings before non-core special items and depreciation, calculated 
as (Sales – Cost of Goods Sold – Selling, General and Administrative Expenses)/Sales. 𝐶𝐸𝑡−1 
is the lagged core earnings; 𝐴𝑇𝑂𝑡 is the asset turnover ratio. In line with prior studies (McVay, 
2006; Fan et al., 2010), we include 𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑈𝐴𝐿𝑆𝑡−1, which is prior year operating accruals and 
𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑈𝐴𝐿𝑆𝑡, which is current year accruals. ∆𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑡 is change in sales and 𝑁𝐸𝐺_∆𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑡 
is the percentage change in sales, where  ∆𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆 is less than 0, otherwise zero. Please note 
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that we estimate panel regressions but we opt to drop the subscript i in models, that indicates 
firm, for simplicity. 
 
4.2 Religion and Classification Shifting 
We follow McVay (2006) model to test whether firms shift core expenses into special items or 
special revenue into normal revenue in order to increase their core earnings. We receive 
information about core expenses or special revenue from the income statement. Core expenses 
are relatively steady, while special items are infrequent or unusual in nature (Fan et al., 2010; 
McVay, 2006). When firms engage in classification shifting, unexpected core earnings would 
increase. The model that we test takes the following form: 
 
𝑈𝑁𝐸𝑋𝑃_𝐶𝐸𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑆𝑃𝐼𝑇𝐸𝑀𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑇 + 𝜀𝑡,     
 
(2) 
where 𝑈𝑁𝐸𝑋𝑃_𝐶𝐸𝑡, is the unexpected core earnings, calculated as the difference between 
reported and normal or expected core earnings from equation (1). The variable of interest 
𝑆𝑃𝐼𝑇𝐸𝑀𝑡 is income-decreasing special items scaled by sales and REVT is total revenue scaled 
by total assets. When firms shift core expenses to income-decreasing special items, they 
increase both core earnings and income-decreasing special items. Similarly, when firms 
classify special revenues as normal revenues they would increase both core earnings and total 
revenues (Fan et al., 2010; McVay, 2006). Therefore, we expect the coefficients β1 and β2 in 
equation 2 above to be positive.  
 
Furthermore, we interact religiosity (REL) with special items (SPITEM) and total revenue 
(REVT) to examine model (3).  
 
𝑈𝑁𝐸𝑋𝑃_𝐶𝐸𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑆𝑃𝐼𝑇𝐸𝑀 + 𝛽2𝑅𝐸𝐿𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑅𝐸𝐿 × 𝑆𝑃𝐼𝑇𝐸𝑀𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑇𝑡−1 + 
𝛽5𝑅𝐸𝐿 × REVT + 𝛽6𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿 𝑉𝐴𝑅𝐼𝐴𝐵𝐿𝐸𝑆 + 𝜀𝑡                 
 
 
(3) 
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where firm-level control variables are; SIZE, LEV, CASFO, ROA, MBV and demographic 
control variables are; AGE, EDUC, POPN, MIN, POL AND INCOME as defined in Appendix 
A.7   
In addition, we augment model 3 to include the interaction between REL and SPITEM, and 
between REL and REVT as well as firm-level control variables as shown in models (4), (5) 
and (6) below: 
 
UNEXP_CE = β0 + β1 SPITEM + β2REL + β3 REL×SPITEM + β4 SIZE + β5 LEV + β6 CASFO 
+ β7 ROA + β8 BMV + β9 BIG4 + β10 ANALYST_FOL +Demographic Control Variables + 
Year Fixed Effects + Industry Fixed Effects.                (4)   
                                                                                             
UNEXP_CE = β0 + β1 REVT + β2REL + β3 REL×REVT  + β4 SIZE + β5 LEV + β6 CASFO + 
β7 ROA + β8 BMV + β9 BIG4 + β10 ANALYST_FOL +Demographic Control Variables + Year 
Fixed Effects + Industry Fixed Effects.     (5) 
 
UNEXP_CE = β0 + + β1 SPITEM + β2REL + β3 REL×SPITEM  +β4 REVT + β5 REL×REVT  
+ β6 SIZE + β7 LEV + β8 CASFO + β9 ROA + β10 BMV + β11 BIG4 + β12 ANALYST_FOL  
+Demographic Control Variables+Year Fixed Effects+Industry Fixed Effects.  (6) 
                                                                                                                                     
To test Hypothesis 1, we examine the coefficient of the religiosity of firms’ environment (REL) 
and the interaction between REL and SPITEM (REL×SPITEM) in equation (4). In equation 
(5), we examine the individual effect of REL and the interaction between REL and REVT 
(REL×REVT), whilst in equation (6) we test for individual effects and interactions between 
REL and REVT and between REL and SPITEM. We expect religiosity to mitigate managers’ 
incentive to misclassify core expenses or special revenue to increase reported core earnings 
                                                 
7 We exclude current accruals from equation (1). Fan et al., (2010) attribute McVay’s (2006) estimation of 
expected core earnings to possible bias because of the inclusion of contemporaneous accruals in expected core 
earnings values. These studies argue that the inclusion of current accruals results in the creation of a mechanical 
bias leading to a positive association between unexpected core earnings (dependent variable) and special items 
(independent variable). This, therefore, suggests that the misclassification of core earnings into special items 
reported by McVay (2006) is not classification shifting but could imply model bias. In the further supplemental 
analyses, we estimate the validity and results for both McVay (2006) and Fan et al (2010) models to assess the 
impact of religiosity on classification shifting and interact religiosity with corporate governance variables, BIG4 
auditors and auditor tenure.  
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because of ethical and moral issues. Therefore, we anticipate a negative coefficient on REL, 
REL×SPITEM and REL×REVT. 
  
We test Hypothesis 2 to assess the impact of REL, REL×SPITEM and REL×REVT on 
UNEXP_CE considering also the underlying corporate governance.  Initially, we control for 
corporate governance variables and test the interaction between REL and corporate governance 
variables.  In particular, we use board size (BODSIZE), number of independent directors 
(BODIND) and audit committees’ size (AUCOM) as proxies for corporate governance in line 
with prior studies (Zalata and Robert, 2016; Haw et al., 2011). The interactions between REL 
and governance variables are: REL×BODSIZE; REL×BODIND and REL×AUCOM. Note that 
board and audit committee characteristics are tested separately to avoid multicollinearity 
problems. We expect a significant and negative relationship between misclassification and 
REL×BODSIZE; REL×BODIND and REL×AUCOM. The following regression model is 
employed to test this expectation:  
 
  UNEXP_CE = β0 + β1 SPITEM + β2REL + β3REL x SPITEM + β4REVT + β5 REL x REVT 
+β6BODSIZE + β7BODIND + β8AUCOM + β9 REL×BODSIZE + β10REL×BODIND + β11 
REL×AUCOM +β12 SIZE + β13LEV + β14CASFO + β15ROA + β16BMV + Demographic 
Control Variables + Year Fixed Effects + Industry Fixed Effects. (7)   
 
Finally, we test Hypothesis 3 to assess the extent to which the interaction term between 
religiosity and auditor characteristics impact classification shifting. We include individual 
effects and interactions between religiosity and Big 4 auditor (REL×BIG4) and between 
religiosity and auditor tenure (REL×TEN). We test the auditor characteristics separately to 
avoid multicollinearity problems. We anticipate significant and negative relationship between 
misclassification and REL×BIG4; REL×TEN. The following regression model is used:  
 
  UNEXP_CE = β0 + β1 SPITEM + β2REL + β3REL x SPITEM + β4REVT + β5 REL x REVT 
+β6BIG4 + β7TEN + β8REL x BIG4 + β9 REL×TEN + β10 SIZE + β11LEV + β12CASFO + 
β13ROA + β14BMV + Demographic Control Variables + Year Fixed Effects + Industry Fixed 
Effects                                                           (8)   
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5. EMPIRICAL REGRESSION RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS 
 
 5.1 Evidence on Hypothesis 1: Religion and classification shifting 
In Table 4, initially, we include SPITEM in Model (2) to provide specific regression results, 
following the empirical approach from specific to general. Note the coefficient on SPITEM is 
positive and significant (p-value = 0.002), suggesting that firms in the U.S. inflate core earnings 
by misclassifying core expenses into special items. When we include REVT in Model (2), the 
coefficient on REVT is positive and significant (p-value = 0.001). Finally, we include both 
SPITEM and REVT and observe a significant positive relationship between unexpected core 
earnings and both SPITEM and REVT. The result indicates that when revenue move upwards 
or core expenses move downwards on the income statement, then we would expect that 
unexpected core earnings (UNEXP_CE) would increase, suggesting that firms might be 
involved in misclassification of special items to increase reported core earnings. This is 
consistent with prior findings that unexpected core earnings increase with special items. Firms 
with huge write-offs and restructuring charges tend to perform poorly but the converse is 
equally true for firms with special items (McVay, 2006; Fan et al., 2010).  
 
(Insert Table 4 here) 
 
Based on Hypothesis 1, we examine the association between religiosity (REL) and unexpected 
core earnings (UNEXP_CE) as well as the interaction between REL and SPITEM as the 
variable of interest (REL×SPITEM). We run regressions using fixed effects to account for 
heterogeneity across firms and the results are shown in Table 5 (see Model 5 above). We find 
that religiosity is negatively related to UNEXP_CE, (p-value = 0.004). Similarly, we find a 
significantly negative relationship between REL×SPITEM and UNEXP_CE (p-value = 0.001). 
In Table 5 Model (6), we interact REL with REVT and report the regression results of 
UNEXP_CE on REL x REVT. The results show a significant negative relationship between 
UNEXP_CE and REL x REVT (p-value = 0.000). We include all the variables of interest in 
Model (7) and re-run our regression. The results are consistent with previous findings as shown 
in Table 5. That is, religiosity mitigates managers’ incentive to misclassify revenue items 
upwards to increase reported core earnings. Therefore, our results suggest that in a religious 
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social norm environment, managers possibly deem it unacceptable, unethical and morally 
wrong to engage in classification shifting to boost core earnings to signal managers’ inside 
information to investors, raise the expectation of the market or beat/meet earnings benchmarks. 
Perhaps, as indicated by prior studies (McVay, 2006; Fan et al. 2010) this might be due to the 
limited scrutiny of auditors and other external monitoring often associated with classification 
shifting. The result is also consistent with prior studies (McGuire et al 2012), which observe 
that accruals earnings management are negatively related to the religiosity of the firms’ 
environment. This is a noble contribution to literature as our study is the first to study the 
association between the unethical, and thereby opportunistic, classification shifting and 
religiosity of the firm’s environment. 
 
    (Insert Table 5 here)  
Moreover, we find that the firm-level control variables are associated with UNEXP_CE in line 
prior studies (Zalata and Roberts, 2016).  For example, the coefficient of ROA is negative and 
significant at 1%, suggesting that firms engage in misclassification when they perform poorly. 
Market book value (MBV) is negative and significant, suggesting that firms are less likely to 
engage in classification shifting when the book value is high. Similarly, SIZE is negatively, but 
insignificantly, associated with UNEXP_CE, indicating that the sample includes larger firms 
than smaller firms. Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2006) observe that small firms are more likely to 
manipulate reported profits than large firms. The impact of classification shifting decreases, 
the greater the size of the firm. We observe a positive and significant relationship at 5% level 
between leverage (LEV) and UNEXP_CE. Baderstscher (2011) indicates that managers 
manipulate reported earnings upwards to meet debt covenants or contracts. The BIG4 audit, 
analyst following and demographic control variables such as population, income levels, 
education and age exhibit their expected sign and significant/insignificant levels in line with 
prior studies (McGuire et al. 2012).    
 
5.1.1 Religiosity and Classification Shifting in High vs Low Religiosity Counties 
The above results and analyses have provided clear evidence that religiosity of the firm’s 
environment influences classification shifting negatively and significantly. However, these 
results do not reveal the extent to which the level (high or low) of religiosity in an area will 
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affect classification shifting. We test this by empirically breaking down the datasets into two 
sub-samples in line with prior research (McGuire et al., 2012), comprising of high and low 
religious areas. We define high (low) religious areas as above (below) the median religiosity 
figure of 52% in our sample. We expect that a highly religious environment will affect 
classification shifting at higher levels of magnitude and significance than areas with low 
religiosity figures8. Table 6 above presents the results of the analysis of high and low religious 
areas on managerial opportunistic classification shifting behaviour. Interestingly, we observe 
a strong negative and significant impact of RELxSPITEM on UNEXP_CE in high religiosity 
areas. Similarly, there is a negative relationship at 1% significance level (p-value<0.03) 
between REVT and UNEXP_CE at the high religiosity areas. We note that the association 
between REL×SPITEM, REL×REVT and UNEXP_CE at the low areas is negative at 5% 
significance level. This reinforces the findings that religious social norms influence 
classification shifting, and that the effect is acute especially in highly religious environments. 
 
(Insert Table 6 here) 
 
5.1.2 Religiosity and Classification Shifting in Rural vs Urban Areas 
 
We provide a sensitivity analysis by considering the impact of religiosity on rural vs urban 
areas. The literature observes that earnings quality is associated with firms in rural areas 
(Loughran and Schulz, 2005). This point is further strengthened when firms in rural areas are 
audited by the BIG4 auditors and have strong internal controls (Dechow et al., 2012). To 
examine whether religious social norms have an impact on firms located in urban and rural 
areas, we opt for the sub-samples of urban and rural areas. In line with Loughran and Schulz 
(2005),9 we classify Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) in each county with over five million 
populations as urban area and repeat the main test using the urban and rural sub-samples. Table 
7 presents the results of the analysis of the relationship between REL×SPITEM, REL x REVT 
                                                 
8 We break our sample into high and low religiosity areas because prior studies (McGuire et al., 2012; Callen et 
al., 2011; Dyreng et al., 2012) indicate that a highly religious environment has significant influence on attitudes 
and behaviour of the people living in that environment. 
9 Loughran and Schulz (2005) define urban areas as the most-populated areas with an average of over five million 
residents in the MSA within the county. We replicate our analysis based on their definition and find that the 
inferences remain the same. 
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and UNEXP_CE for firms located in urban and rural areas. Indeed, the conclusions remain the 
same using both rural and urban sub-samples. We find that both REL×SPITEM and REL× 
REVT are negatively and significantly (at 1% level, p-value = 0.004) associated with 
UNEXP_CE, suggesting that the negative association between religious social norms and 
misclassification is not solely down to the high (low) earnings quality associated with rural 
(urban) areas as previously reported in the literature (Loughran and Schulz, 2005). Indeed, note 
that the magnitude of the interaction terms REL×SPITEM and REL× REVT, also magnitude 
of the REL, is higher in the urban areas compared to rural areas. Thus, religious social norms 
are more effective to reduce classification shifting in highly populated areas. Overall, the 
findings are robust and clearly demonstrate that religiosity of the firms’ environment mitigates 
classification shifting.  
 
       (Insert Table 7 here) 
 
5.1.3 Religiosity and Classification Shifting:  Geographical Dispersion 
McGuire et al. (2012) indicate that firms are geographically dispersed with geographic 
segments often located in areas far away from their corporate headquarters.  Some of these 
segments have autonomous structures which allow them to make decisions on behalf of the 
corporate headquarters. Therefore, it could be the case that geographical dispersion could affect 
the impact of religion on classification shifting. For example, the segmental reports of firms 
located away from the headquarters could  be influenced by the religious social norms of the 
area where these firms are located. Consequently, we employ two sub-samples in line with the 
geographic segments data from the Compustat to assess whether the results differ based on the 
geographic dispersion of the firm.  Following prior research (McGuire et al., 2012), we utilise 
the geographic segments data from the Compustat annual database. Thereafter, we find the 
mean and median of the segments and observe that 2.05 represent the mean of segments, the 
median segment is 1.04 and the maximum number of geographic segments is 35. Therefore, 
we classify firms with two or less geographic segments as being centralized and those firms 
with more than two geographic segments as geographically dispersed.  
Table 8 shows the regressions results of geographically centralised and dispersed segments. 
We find that the association between religion and unexpected core earnings is significantly 
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negative at 1% in the geographically centralised sample, consistent with the earlier findings. 
For example, the coefficient on both REL x SPITEM and REL x REVT are negative and 
significant at 1% level. In contrast, the relationship between religiosity and unexpected core 
earnings is negative, but not significant, in the geographically dispersed sample. This result 
suggests that the geographic dispersion influences the extent to which religious social norms 
subdue expense or revenue misclassification to increase reported core earnings. Furthermore, 
the results confirm that religious social norms in the firms’ environment have negative impact 
on expense or revenue misclassification, in particular for the centralised firms. 
(Insert Table 8 Here) 
To consider possible selection bias in Table 8, we examine whether the difference in the size 
of the two sub-samples affects reported results . So, we run centralised regressions using 4,541 
firm year observations to maintain consistency across both sub-samples size. The untabulated 
results are similar and consistent with the ones reported in Table 8. The coefficient of SPITEM 
is positive and significantly related to UNEXP_CE. In addition, the coefficients on both REL 
x SPITEM and REL x REVT are negative and significant at 1% level. This suggests that our 
results are not prone or subject to sample selection bias.  
 
5.1.4. Validity of McVay’s (2006) Model 
In Table 9, we estimate the results for both Athanasakou et al. (2009) and Fan et al. (2010) 
expectation models. To test the validity of Fan et al. (2010) model, we drop contemporaneous 
accruals. We find that UNEXP_CE is positively and significantly (p-value =0.002) associated 
with SPITEM and REVT. Also, interactions terms, REL×SPITEM and REL× REVT are 
negatively and significantly (p-value < 0.001) associated with UNEXP_CE.  Thus, the results 
are similar to McVay’s (2006), suggesting that our initial findings of misclassification of core 
expenses and revenue items rooted in McVay’s (2006) expectation model is bias free. 
Furthermore, in line with Athanasakou et al. (2009), we employ working capital accruals as 
proxy for total accruals as also in Fan et al (2010) expectation models. Athanasakou et al. 
(2009) argue that the substitution of working capital accruals is important because total accruals 
in the McVay's (2006) model comprise of depreciation expenses and special items accruals, 
which are likely to introduce bias. Therefore, we provide regression results using working 
capital accruals. Results hold and inferences remain similar to McVay’s (2006).  
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(Insert Table 9 here)    
 
5.2 Evidence on Hypothesis 2: Religiosity, Corporate Governance Variables and 
Classification Shifting 
We test Hypothesis 2 to assess the impact of the interaction between religiosity and governance 
variables on unexpected core earnings so as to ensure that previous findings are robust in the 
presence of internal corporate governance. We include BODSIZE, BODIND and AUCOM in 
line with prior research (Zalata and Roberts, 2016).  Thereafter, we focus on the interaction 
between REL×BODSIZE, REL×BODIND and REL×AUCOM. As indicated in Table 10, we 
find a significant negative relationship (p-value = 0.001) between REL×SPITEM and 
UNEXP_CE. The coefficient on REL x REVT and UNEXP_CE is negative and significant (-
0.13). Consistent with prior research (Haw et al., 2011), the results show that there is a negative 
association at 5% significant level between UNEXP_CE and BODSIZE, and between 
UNEXP_CE and BODIND at 10% significant level, suggesting that corporate governance 
mechanism within the firms’ in our sample mitigates misclassification of core expenses or 
special revenue items. The relationship between UNEXP_CE and AUCOM is negative but not 
significant. With regards to the interactions, we also find significant (1%) negative association 
between REL×BODSIZE, REL×BODIND, REL×AUCOM and UNEXP_CE. These results 
suggest that: firstly, large board size constrains classification shifting and this may be due to 
the size or the presence of financial experts on the board. This is consistent with the findings 
of (Peasnell et al. (2005) and Xie et al. (2003) who observe that the optimal board size 
influences managerial decision and financial reporting quality. Secontly, results also suggest 
that misclassification is less common in firms with large number of independent directors, 
which confirms the arguments that independent directors on the board are able or are more 
likely to confront or monitor aggressive misreporting of financial information (Zalata and 
Robert, 2016). In summary, the results suggest that REL complements BODSIZE, BODIND 
and AUCOM to mitigate classification shifting, and the impact becomes relatively more 
pronounced in a religious social norms environment.  
 
      (Insert Table 10 here) 
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5.3. Testing Hypothesis 3: Religiosity, Auditor Characteristics and Classification Shifting.  
We test Hypothesis 3 to assess the extent to which the interaction term between religiosity and 
auditor characteristics impact classification shifting. Prior studies (Haw et al., 2011; Francis 
and Yu, 2009) observe that auditor characteristics (BIG4 and auditor tenure) are negatively 
associated with accruals earnings management since high quality auditors complement existing 
corporate governance mechanism. However, Zalata and Roberts (2016) indicate that auditors 
provide limited scrutiny of expense misclassification due to the fact that misclassification does 
not violate the GAAP/FASB accounting rules. Therefore, we proceed now to examine the 
extent to which the interaction between religiosity and auditor characteristics impact on 
classification shifting. Panel A in Table 11 reports the regression results when we include only 
income-decreasing special items (SPITEM) in Model (5). The results show a positive and 
significant co-efficient of (0.14). The coefficient on REL×BIG4 is negative and significant (-
0.13). Similarly, the interaction term REL×SPITEM×BIG4 shows a significant and negative 
coefficient of (-0.25), indicating that in a religious social norm environment, misclassification 
behaviour is constrained substantially, and this is induced by BIG4 auditors. These results 
imply that, even though, BIG4 auditors might pay less attention to expense misclassification 
(see Zalata and Roberts 2016), BIG4 auditors complements religiosity and existing monitoring 
mechanisms to mitigate unethical misclassification in a religious social norms environment. In 
Model (6), we include only special revenue and observe a significant positive relationship 
between REVT and SPITEM (0.06), but the coefficient on REVT×BIG4 is negative but not 
significant (-0.03). Thereafter, we interact REL, REVT and BIG4, and the results show that the 
coefficient on REL×REVT×BIG4 is negative and significant (-0.18). When both REVT and 
SPITEM are included in Model (7), the results and inferences remain the same. The coefficient 
on SPITEM×BIG4 is -0.05 and that of REVT×BIG4 is -0.04, though significance is an issue. 
The coefficient on REL×SPITEM×BIG4 is -0.17 and REL×REVT×BIG4 is -0.16, both being 
negative and significant at 10%. Overall, we report evidence that firms with BIG4 auditors in 
high religious counties engage less in classification shifting. Note though that there is some 
variability in the significance of such an effect. 
(Insert Table 11 here) 
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In Table 11, Panel B, we report regression results to indicate whether auditor’s tenure and the 
interaction between auditor’s tenure and religiosity affects classification shifting.  We include 
SPITEM in Model (5) and report that its coefficient is positive and significant at 1%, while the 
coefficient for SPITEM×TEN is negative, but not significant, suggesting that auditor’s tenure 
might not mitigate classification shifting. We include the interaction between REL and TEN as 
well as REL, SPITEM and TEN in Model (5).  The coefficient on REL×TEN is negative and 
significant at 5% and the coefficient on REL×SPITEM×TEN is also negative and significant, 
implying that auditor tenure alone does not mitigate misclassification behaviour. Perhaps, this 
is the case because of certain degree of familiarity between the auditor and management as the 
former serves for a longer period. We also control for REVT in Model (6). The coefficient of 
REVT is positive and significant at 1%. On the other hand, the results for interactive terms 
REL x TEN and REL×REVT×TEN show negative signs, though there is significance  for the 
latter interaction. These results demonstrate that religiosity in a firm’s environment mitigates 
special revenue misclassification and this negative impact is induced by auditor tenure. For 
robustness test, we include both SPITEM and REVT in Model (7) and the results remain the 
same.  
 
Overall our reported results indicate that classification shifting is subdued in a religious social 
norm environment and that religiosity complements the existing monitoring mechanism such 
as corporate governance and audit practices.    
 
6. ROBUSTNESS CHECKS 
     
6.1. Testing Misclassification in Pre and Post Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) Act (2002) and the 
Financial Crisis Period 
To ensure that the results of our study are not influenced by confounding effects of various 
events that took place during the study period, we examine the extent to which religiosity 
affects misclassification of special items in the pre and post SOX Act (2002) or the financial 
crisis in 2007-2009. Cohen and Zarowin (2010) indicate that the SOX enactment brought about 
an improvement in the reliability of financial information and a reduction of financial statement 
fraud by strengthening the corporate governance and improving the liquidity of firms. They 
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observe that the level of real activities increases, but accruals management decreases, after the 
enactment of SOX Act in 2002.  
 
To examine the impact of regulation and financial crisis, we select sub-samples as follows: 
prior and after the implementation of the SOX Act in 2002; and the period prior (2003-2006),  
during the financial crisis (2007-2009), and post the financial crisis period (2010-2015). 
Thereafter, we run regressions to examine the impact of religious social norms on 
misclassification during the sub-samples. 
 
The regression results in Table 12 show that firms in the U.S. engage in misclassification to 
boost reported core earnings in pre and post SOX Act (2002), as well as during and post the 
financial crisis. Prior to the enactment of SOX Act (2002), the results show a positive and 
significant co-efficient (0.32) between SPITEM and UNEXP_CE. Similarly, the results in post-
SOX and financial crisis periods show a positive and significant relationship between SPITEM 
and UNEXP_CE respectively. However, the effect is remarkable and much more pronounced 
during the financial crisis period (0.49). This suggests that during the financial crisis period, 
firms in the U.S. opportunistically engaged in unethical classification shifting, perhaps, to 
avoid reporting losses or to boost their reported core earnings (McVay, 2006). The relationship 
between REVT and UNEXP_CE is also positive and significant in pre-and post-SOX Act 
(2002) and/or financial crisis period (0.19; 0.14 and 0.23 respectively). These results also imply 
that classification shifting is a prevalent issue among firms in the U.S. to boost reported core 
earnings and such effects are acute during the financial crisis period. The financial crisis 
brought hardship upon firms and affected investor confidence globally. Perhaps, the increase 
in the degree of misclassification during financial crisis can also be partly attributed to the 
limited auditor scrutiny or non-FASB/GAAP violation (Zalata and Roberts, 2015; McVay, 
2006). It could also mean that firms opportunistically engage in misclassification in the post-
SOX or during the financial crisis period to boost investors’ confidence, increase firm mangers’ 
private benefits, meet or beat analysts forecast (Kothari et al., 2016, Zalata and Robert, 2015) 
due to poor financial performance. On the contrary, the interactive terms REL x SPITEM and 
REL x REVT both carry a negative sign and are significant across all sub-samples suggesting 
that religiosity in a firm’s environment would continue to mitigate misclassification. Note 
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though that such effects are much more pronounced post-SOX enactment and post the financial 
crisis.  
 (Insert Table 12 Here) 
6.2. Alternative Measure of Religiosity 
Although the measure of religious social norm is supported by prior studies (McGuire et al. 
2012; Callen et al 2011; Grullon et al. 2010), we conduct further robustness tests to ensure that 
the results are free from potential bias and do not rely on generalisation of religious datasets 
across several years. We follow McGuire et al. (2012) and use different source of religious 
datasets collected by Gallup survey for the study period.10 We run regressions for only the 
twenty U.S. States with available Gallup religious datasets. The inferences still remain the same 
when religiosity is measured by a simple aggregate of the responses to the three Gallup 
questions on religion. Specifically, the coefficients on REL x SPITEM and REL x REVT are 
negative and significant (-0.13 and -0.11 respectively), indicating that religiosity mitigates 
unethical classificatory behaviour.  
 
7. CONCLUSION 
Consistent with prior studies (Fan et al., 2010; McVay, 2006), we demonstrate that special 
items increase with unexpected core earnings, hence, the positive relationship between special 
items and unexpected core earnings. We contribute to financial reporting and earnings 
management literature and provide evidence that religiosity is negatively associated with 
upward and downward unethical classification shifting.  
Overall, our results suggest that religious social norms of the firm environment subdue 
misclassification behaviour and complements existing monitoring systems put in place by 
management. In particular, for the first time, we show that religiosity complements corporate 
governance and auditor characteristics to subdue misclassification. We provide first time 
evidence to indicate the negative influence of religious social norms in subduing management 
                                                 
10 Thereafter, we take a sub-sample of our original data based on the twenty most and least religious states in the 
U.S. as reported by Gallup survey in Table 2. We surrogate our original religious datasets by Gallup religious 
datasets for the twenty U.S. States and merge them into the Compustat financial data file using the state code 
identifiers. 
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incentive to shift core expense or revenue items into special items. We document first time 
evidence of misclassification in pre and post SOX Act (2002), rural and urban areas, 
geographically centralised and dispersed segments. In general, our results indicate that in a 
religious social norm environment, managers have disincentive to signal information to 
investors to increase reported core earnings. 
 Our findings show that religion through the ethical channel would improve firm’s ethical 
behaviour. The study highlights the complementary role of religion to directly halt 
misclassification, whilst it does so also indirectly through its interactions with corporate 
governance and audit practices. Therefore, religiosity provides a platform upon which the 
management could further strengthen the existing corporate governance structures and audit 
practices. This is important because, although religion is scarcely discussed in secular 
organisations, understanding its role in shaping corporate financial reporting is valuable from 
an ethical point of view. The present results are useful for regulators, external monitors and 
investors alike as they indicate that religion subdues misreporting and strengthens the existing 
monitoring mechanism put in place by management to mitigate unethical classification shifting 
behaviour. 
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Appendix A: The following table shows the measurement of variables in the study. 
Variables Proxy Definition 
 
Religiosity  
REL 
Strength of religiosity for each U.S. county 
measured by Association of Statisticians of 
American Religious Bodies (ASARB) surveys. 
The results of these surveys are published on the 
website of Association of Religion Data Archive 
(ARDA). The average of each county religiosity 
score is weighted by the county’s population. 
Normal Core 
Earnings 
NOR_CE This is the core earnings that is actually expected 
to occur in the normal course of business activity 
devoid of classification shifting.  The study 
follows McVay (2006) expectation model in 
equation 1. 
 
Reported Core 
Earnings 
    REP_CE
 
Estimated as sales – cost of goods sold – selling, 
general and administration expenses. Depreciation 
and Amortization are excluded from Cost of Sales, 
Selling, General and Administrative Expenses. 
Unexpected Core 
Earnings    UNEXP_CE 
Is the difference between reported core earnings 
and normal or expected core earnings (McVay, 
2006). 
Special Items 
SPTIEM 
Income-Decreasing Special Items as a Percentage 
of Sales, calculated as [Special Items (#17)  
]/Sales (#12) when Special Items are income-
decreasing, and 0 otherwise (McVay, 2006) 
Total Revenue REVT Total revenue scaled by total assets 
 
Asset Turnover ATO
 
Sales scaled by average net operating assets. 
Where net operating assets is the difference 
between operating assets and operating liabilities. 
Operating assets = Total assets – Cash and Cash 
equivalent. Operating Liabilities = Total assets – 
Total debt - Book value of common equity – 
Preferred equity – Minority interests.
 Percent change in 
sales 
∆Sales
 
(Salest – Salest-1)/ Salest-1
 % change in Sales NEG_∆Sales
 
where ∆SALES is less than 0, otherwise zero
 Cash flow from 
operation 
CASFO Is the cash flow from operational activities scaled 
lagged total assets 
Total Assets TA Measured as total Non-current assets plus total 
current assets 
Size of the Firm SIZE The natural log of total assets 
Return on Assets ROA Measured as net income before extraordinary 
items divided by average total assets 
Leverage LEV Financial leverage, measured as total debts scaled 
by total equity 
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Market to Book 
Value 
MBV Measured as total assets divided by market 
capitalization 
Reported Loss  LOSS An indicator variable that equals 1 if income 
before extraordinary items was negative in the 
current or previous two fiscal years, and 0 
otherwise; 
Audit Committee 
Presence  
AUCOM A dummy variable coded as 1 if the company has 
an audit committee, otherwise zero. 
Independent Board  BODIND Calculated as the number of independent directors 
divided by the total number of directors on the 
board. Defined as non-executive directors holding 
less than 5% of the voting securities and having no 
direct or indirect interest or relationship that could 
reasonably influence their objective judgment and 
decision making 
Board Size  BODSIZE Total number of directors on the board 
Religiosity 
interacts Board size 
 RELBODSIZE Religiosity multiplied by Board Size 
Religiosity 
interacts Board 
independence 
RELBODIND Religiosity multiplied by Board independence 
Religiosity 
interacts Audit 
Committee 
RELAUCOM Religiosity multiplied by Audit committee 
BIG4 Auditors BIG4 
Is an indicator variable that equals 1 if a 
company’s auditing firm is one of the BIG4 
auditors, otherwise zero (0)   
Audit Tenure TEN 
The natural log of the number years the auditor 
has been with the company. 
Analysts Following ANA_FOL 
Natural log of the number of analyst following 
the firm 
Total Accruals  
TAC 
Difference between earnings before extraordinary 
items and discontinued operations and the cash 
flow from operational activities scaled by lagged 
total assets 
Operating Accrual 
ACCRUALS
 
Operating Accrual = (Net income before 
extraordinary items – cash flow from 
operation)/Sales.
 Working Capital 
Accruals WC_ACCRUALS 
Measured as earnings before extraordinary items 
plus depreciation and amortisation minus cash 
flow from operational activities. 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for Religiosity. 
Variable  Mean Std. Dev. Q1 Median Q3 Skewness Kurtosis 
REL 53.5 18.07 36.27 52.47 63.33 0.83 2.69 
RELAdh – 2000 53 18.6 39.4 51.1 64.7 0.74 2.98 
RELAdh – 2010 48 15.6 24.6 46.8 52.3 0.88 2.68 
Notes: Religiosity (REL) = is the variable of interest, measured as the average of US counties religiosity score weighted by 
the county’s population for the period, 2000 and 2010. RELAdh = a measure of religious adherence for US counties in, 2000 
and 2010. Association of Statisticians of American Religious Bodies (ASARB) collects religiosity dataset, which are published 
by the Association of Religion Data Archive (ARDA). 
Table 2: Comparison of Most and Least Religious States in the US. 
Ten Most  
Religious States in US 
Ranking 
Top States 
Ten Least 
 Religious States in US 
Ranking 
Bottom States 
Mississippi 1 Vermont 1 
Utah 2 New Hampshire 2 
Alabama 3 Maine 3 
Louisiana 4 Massachusetts 4 
South Carolina 5 Oregon 5 
Tennessee 6 Nevada 6 
Georgia 7 Washington 7 
Arkansas 8 Connecticut 8 
North Carolina 9 Hawaii 9 
Oklahoma 10 District of Columbia 10 
Notes: Table 2 shows comparison of most and least religious states in the US compiled by Gallup. Since 1965, Gallup has 
conducted interviews about US adults’ religiosity. The results over the years suggest that religious attitudes are very stable, 
consistent with ASARB studies. The percentage of US adults who consider religion to be important according to Gallup are 
as follows: 1990 = 58 percent; 2000 = 58 percent; 2005 = 55 percent; 2006 = 56 percent; 2007 = 56 percent; 2008 = 54 percent; 
2009 = 56 percent; 2010 = 56 percent 
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Notes: UNEXP_CE = computed as the difference between reported core earnings (REP_CE) and expected core earnings 
(NOR_CE) for each firm (McVay, 2006). REP_CE is the reported core earnings estimated as sales – cost of goods sold – 
selling, general and administration expenses. Depreciation and Amortization are excluded from Cost of Sales, Selling, General 
and Administrative Expenses. BODSIZE = total number of directors on the board; BODIND = calculated as the number of 
independent directors divided by the total number of directors on the board; AUCOM = audit committee REL×BODSIZE 
= religiosity multiplied by board size; REL×BODIND = religiosity multiplied by board independence; 
REL×AUCOM = religiosity multiplied by audit committee. REVT is total revenue scaled by total assets. 
REL×REVT =religiosity multiplied by total revenue scaled by total assets. ATO is Sales scaled by average net 
operating assets. Where net operating assets is the difference between operating assets and operating liabilities. Operating 
assets = Total assets – Cash and Cash equivalent. Operating Liabilities = Total assets – Total debt - Book value of common 
equity – Preferred equity – Minority interests. ACCRUALS is calculated as (Net income before extraordinary items – cash 
flow from operation)/Sales. ∆Sales is (Salest – Salest-1)/ Salest and NEG_∆Sales is where ∆SALES is less than 0, otherwise 
zero. SIZE is the natural log of total assets, LEV is the financial leverage measured as the total debts scaled by total equity, 
CASFO is the cash flow from operational activities scaled lagged total assets ROA is measured as net income before 
extraordinary items divided by average total assets and MBV is measured as total assets divided by market capitalization. All 
other variables are defined above and in the Appendix A.
 
Table 3:  Descriptive Statistics for the Full Sample 
Variables Mean Median S.D. 25% 75% 
SALES (in M) 1627.363 202.597 3441.067 30.883 1159.031 
UNEXP_CE 0.002 0.003 0.069 -0.003 0.004 
SPITEM 0.002 0.001 0.012 0.001 0.008 
REVT 0.021 0.011 0.061 0.001 0.029 
RELxSPITEM -0.004 -0.003 0.002 -0.001 0.003 
RELxREVT 0.005 0.003 0.159 0.000 0.109 
BODSIZE 11.428 11.303 4.196 9.597 13.245 
BODIND 0.670 0.720 0.078 0.650 0.770 
AUCOM 5.458 5.256 2.284 4.125 5.502 
REL×BODSIZE 6.905 6.960 1.862 6.226 7.558 
REL×BODIND 0.081 0.108 0.033 0.055 0.32 
REL×AUCOM 3.567 3.744 1.097 3.726 3.834 
ATO 2.143 1.782 1.531 0.950 2.981 
CHANGE_ATO 0.029 0.004 0.376 -0.135 0.141 
ACCRUALS -0.019 0.028 0.201 -0.035 0.077 
ACCRUALSt-1 -0.026 0.029 0.254 -0.030 0.078 
∆SALES 0.096 0.058 0.300 -0.055 0.191 
NEG_∆SALES 0.075 0.043 0.359 -0.048 0.176 
SIZE 5.680 5.190 1.760 3.390 6.860 
LEV 0.151 0.101 0.162 0.001 0.252 
CASFO 0.072 0.089 0.156 0.045 0.141 
ROA -0.311 0.042 0.141 -0.032 0.084 
MBV 2.012 1.754 1.212 1.024 2.912 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 36 
Table 4: Regression of Unexpected Core Earnings on Special Expenses and Special 
Revenue.  
Variables  SPITEM REVT SPITEM & REVT  
 Coefficient t-values Coefficient t-values Coefficient t-values 
Intercept 0.002 0.33 -0.010 -2.47** -0.08 -2.30*** 
SPITEM 0.31 3.11***   0.46 4.20*** 
REVT   0.13 3.65*** 0.14 3.57*** 
Fixed 
Effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 23,164 23,164 23,164 23,164 23,164 23,164 
Adjusted R2 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.09 0.09 
Notes: We use *,**,*** in a two tailed test to respectively indicate statistical significance at 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 
percent levels. We show co-efficient estimates and t-statistics in separate columns. SPITEM = income-decreasing special items 
scaled by sales, REVT is total revenue scaled by total assets. The parameters are estimated based on the following model: All variables 
are defined in Appendix A. 
 
  UNEXP_CE = β0 + β1 SPITEM + β2 REVT. 
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Table 5: Regression of Unexpected Core Earnings on Special Items Expenses and 
Special Revenue    
 
Variables  Model (5)  Model (6)  Model (7)  
 Coefficient t-values Coefficient t-values Coefficient t-values 
Intercept -0.07 -1.61 0.06 1.74* -0.04 -1.30 
SPITEM  0.28 3.78***   0.16 3.41*** 
REVT   0.16 4.35*** 0.12 3.97*** 
REL -0.34 -3.74*** -0.30 3.38** -0.28 -2.76** 
REL×SPITEM -0.23 -2.92***   -0.19 -2.56** 
REL×REVT   -0.09   -7.88*** -0.08 -4.51** 
SIZE -0.03 -1.45 -0.05 -1.17 -0.06 -1.19 
LEV  0.07 2.26** 0.09 2.53** 0.10 2.68** 
CASFO  0.09 1.10 0.02 1.07 0.05 1.15 
ROA -0.06  3.37*** -0.16  2.37** -0.18  2.39** 
MBV -0.03 -2.07** -0.04 -1.77* -0.06 -1.78* 
BIG4 -0.04 -1.62 -0.03 -1.22 -0.04 -1.28 
ANA_FOL -0.04 -1.56 -0.02 -1.36 -0.04 -1.42 
Demographic 
Controls  
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed 
Effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed 
Effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 23,164 23,164 23,164 23,164 23,164 23,164 
Adjusted R2 0.16 0.16 0.18 0.18 0.24 0.24 
Notes: We use *,**,*** in a two tailed test to respectively indicate statistical significance at 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 
percent levels. We show co-efficient estimates and t-statistics in separate columns. SPITEM = income-decreasing special items 
scaled by sales, REVT is total revenue scaled by total assets, REL = religiosity of the firms’ environment, REL×SPITEM = interaction between 
religiosity and income-decreasing special items. REL×REVT = interaction between religiosity and total revenue scaled by total assets. SIZE 
is the natural log of total assets, LEV is the financial leverage measured as the total debts scaled by total equity, CASFO is the cash flow from 
operational activities scaled by lagged total assets. ROA is measured as net income before extraordinary items divided by average total assets 
and MBV is measured as total assets divided by market capitalization. BIG4 is an indicator variable that equals 1 if a firm is audited by the 
BIG4, otherwise zero and ANLYST_FOL represents the natural log of the number of financial analyst following the firm. The parameters are 
estimated based on the following model: All variables are defined in Appendix A. 
UNEXP_CE = β0 + + β1 SPITEM + β2REL + β3 SPITEM × REL +β4 REVT + β5 REVT × REL + β6 SIZE + β7 LEV + β8 
CASFO + β9 ROA + β10 BMV + β11 BIG4 + β12 ANALYST_FOL + Demographic Control Variables + Year Fixed Effects 
+Industry Fixed Effects 
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Table 6: Classification Shifting in High and Low Religiosity Areas 
 HIGH  LOW 
Variables Coefficient t-values  Coefficient t-values 
Intercept -0.08 -0.060  -0.03 -0.077 
SPITEM 0.08 3.16***  0.04 2.45** 
REVT 0.18 3.85***  0.09 2.20** 
REL -0.36 -3.09***  -0.07 -1.46 
REL×SPITEM -0.26 -3.28***  -0.06 -1.09 
REL×REVT -0.14 -3.09***  -0.08 -1.39 
SIZE -0.08 -2.45**  -0.05 -2.04** 
LEV 0.08 1.61   0.08  1.32 
CASFO 0.15 2.91**   0.11  0.62 
ROA -0.05 -2.18**  -0.12 -1.78* 
MBV -0.06 -1.69*  -0.05 -1.19 
BIG4 -0.04 -1.54  -0.03 -0.89 
ANA_FOL -0.03 -1.21  -0.02 -1.02 
Demographic Controls 
Variables 
Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.27 0.27  0.22 0.22 
Observations 14,124 14,124  8,566 8,566 
Notes: We use *,**,*** in a two tailed test to respectively indicate statistical significance at 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels. We 
show co-efficient estimates and t-statistics in separate columns. SPITEM = income-decreasing special items scaled by sales, REVT is total 
revenue scaled by total assets, REL = religiosity of the firms’ environment, REL×SPITEM = interaction between religiosity and income-
decreasing special items. REL×REVT = interaction between religiosity and total revenue scaled by total assets. SIZE is the natural log of total 
assets, LEV is the financial leverage measured as the total debts scaled by total equity, CASFO is the cash flow from operational activities 
scaled by lagged total assets. ROA is measured as net income before extraordinary items divided by average total assets and MBV is measured 
as total assets divided by market capitalization BIG4 is an indicator variable that equals 1 if a firm is audited by the BIG4, otherwise zero and 
ANLYST_FOL represents the natural log of the number of financial analysts following the firm. The parameters are estimated based on the 
following model: All variables are defined in Appendix A. 
 
UNEXP_CE = β0 + + β1 SPITEM + β2REL + β3 SPITEM × REL +β4 REVT +  β5 REVT × REL + β6 SIZE + β7 LEV + β8 CASFO + β9 ROA 
+ β10 BMV + β11 BIG4 + β12 ANALYST_FOL+ Demographic Control Variables + Year Fixed Effects +Industry Fixed Effects 
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Table 10: Impact of Religiosity and Governance Variables on Classification Shifting 
 
 Coefficient  t-value 
Intercept -0.08  -1.37 
SPITEM 0.06  2.94*** 
REVT 0.19  3.50*** 
REL -0.12  -3.64*** 
RELxSPITEM -0.15  -3.12*** 
RELxREVT -0.13  -3.82*** 
BODSIZE -0.03  -2.22** 
BODIND -0.04  -1.74* 
AUCOM -0.02  -0.74 
REL×BODSIZE -0.24  -3.92*** 
REL×BODIND -0.39  -3.67*** 
REL×AUCOM -0.17  -2.87*** 
SIZE -0.02  -1.17 
LEV 0.11  1.78* 
CASFO 0.03  0.86 
ROA -0.07  -1.19 
MBV -0.03  -1.81* 
ANALY_FOL -0.4  -1.37 
Demographic Controls  Yes  Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes  Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes  Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.52  0.52 
Observations 23164  23164  
We use *,**,*** in a two tailed test to respectively indicate statistical significance at 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels. We show co-
efficient estimates and t-statistics in separate columns. SPITEM = income-decreasing special items scaled by sales, REVT is total revenue 
scaled by total assets. REL = religiosity of the firms’ environment, REL x SPITEM = interaction between religiosity and income-decreasing 
special items. REL×REVT = interaction between religiosity and total revenue scaled by total assets. SIZE is the natural log of total assets, 
LEV is the financial leverage measured as the total debts scaled by total equity, CASFO is the cash flow from operational activities scaled by 
lagged total assets. ROA is measured as net income before extraordinary items divided by average total assets and MBV is measured as total 
assets divided by market capitalization. BODSIZE = total number of directors on the board; BODIND = calculated as the number of 
independent directors divided by the total number of directors on the board; AUCOM = a dummy variable coded as 1 if the company has an 
audit committee, otherwise zero; REL×BODSIZE = religiosity multiplied by board size; REL×BODIND = religiosity multiplied by board 
independence; REL×AUCOM = religiosity multiplied by audit committee; The parameters are estimated based on the following model. All 
variables are defined in the Appendix A. 
UNEXP_CE = β0 + β1 SPITEM + β2REL + β3RELSPITEM + β4 REVT + β5 REVT × REL + β6BODSIZE + β7BODIND + 
β8AUCOM + β9RELxBODSIZE + β10RELxBODIND + β11RELxAUCOM +β12 SIZE + β13LEV + β14CASFO + β15ROA + 
β16BMV +Demographic Control Variables + Year Fixed Effects +Industry Fixed Effects 
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Table 11: Regression of Unexpected Core Earnings on Special Items Expenses and 
Special Revenue: Auditor Characteristics & Religiosity.  
Panel A: BIG4 Auditors 
Variables  Model (5) 
SPITEM 
Model (6) 
REVT 
Model (7) 
SPITEM & REVT 
 Coefficient t-values Coefficient t-values Coefficient t-values 
Intercept -0.05 -0.37 0.07 1.31 0.06 0.80 
SPITEM  0.14   2.03**   0.16   2.05** 
SPITEM×BIG4 -0.04 -1.09   -0.05 -1.54 
REVT    0.06  2.05** 0.09   1.97** 
REVT×BIG4   -0.03 -1.23 -0.04 -1.36 
REL×SPITEM×BIG4 -0.25 -2.21**   -0.17 -1.81** 
REL×REVT×BIG4   -0.18 -2.14** -0.16 -1.98** 
REL×BIG4 -0.13  -1.94**  -0.05 -2.32** -0.07 -2.33** 
BIG4 -0.08 -1.24 -0.03 -1.42 -0.09  -0.883 
Demo. Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 23,164 23,164 23,164 23,164 23,164 23,164 
Adjusted R2 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.11 0.11 
Panel B: Auditor Tenure 
Intercept -0.04 -0.39 -0.02 -0.54 -0.03         0.69 
SPITEM  0.33 2.94***   -0.30  2.86*** 
SPITEM×TEN -0.06 -1.38   -0.08 -1.21 
REVT    0.02 3.09***        0.02  3.04*** 
REVT×TEN   -0.09 -2.40**  -0.08 -2.68** 
REL×SPITEM×TEN  -0.05 -2.45**    -0.07 3.15*** 
REL×REVT×TEN   -0.06  2.31**     -0.08**  -2.39** 
RELTEN -0.04 -2.08** -0.08 -1.82*    -0.07* -1.78* 
TEN -0.02 -0.88 -0.04 -1.54  -0.05 -1.55 
Demo. Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 23,164 23,164 23,164 23,164 23,164 23,164 
Adjusted R2 0.08 0.08 0.06 0.06 0.09 0.09 
Notes: We use *,**,*** in a two tailed test to respectively indicate statistical significance at 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels. We 
show co-efficient estimates and t-statistics in separate columns.  Dependent Variable = UNEXP_CE, SPITEM = income-decreasing special 
items scaled by sales, REVT is total revenue scaled by total assets. REL = religiosity of the firms’ environment, BIG4 is an indicator 
variable that equals 1 if a firm is audited by the BIG4 auditing firm, otherwise zero. SPITEM×BIG4 = interaction between BIG4 auditors 
and total revenue by total assets. REVT×BIG4 = interaction between BIG4 and total revenue scaled by total assets. REL×SPITEM×BIG4 
= interaction among religiosity, BIG4 auditors and income-decreasing special items. REL×REVT×BIG4 = interaction among religiosity, 
BIG4 auditors and total revenue scaled by total assets.  REL×BIG4 = interaction between BIG4 and religiosity. TEN = is the natural log 
of the number of years the auditor has been with the company. SPITEM×TEN = interaction between income-decreasing special items and 
auditor tenure. REVT×TEN = interaction between total revenue scaled by total assets and auditor tenure. REL×TEN = interaction between 
auditor tenure and religiosity. The parameters are estimated based on the following model: All variables are defined in Appendix A. 
UNEXP_CE = β0 + β1 SPITEM + β2REL + β3REL x SPITEM + β4REVT + β5 REL x REVT +β6BIG4 + β7TEN + β8REL x 
BIG4 + β9 REL×TEN + β10 SIZE + β11LEV + β12CASFO + β13ROA + β14BMV + Demographic Control Variables + Year 
Fixed Effects + Industry Fixed Effects 
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Table 9: Religiosity and Different Models of Classification Shifting. 
 Athanasakou et al. 
(2009) Model 
 Fan et al. 
 (2010) Model 
Variables Coefficient t-values  Coefficient t-values 
Intercept -0.08 -0.65  -0.05 -0.73 
SPITEM 0.07 3.27***  0.08 2.96*** 
REVT 0.16 3.78***  0.12 2.24** 
REL -0.12 -2.93***  -0.17 -3.65*** 
REL×SPITEM -0.15 -3.09***  -0.13 -3.07*** 
REL×REVT -0.09 -3.83***  -0.11 -2.48** 
SIZE -0.03 -2.14**  -0.04 -2.48** 
LEV 0.19 1.41  0.03  1.56 
CASFO 0.19 1.49  0.13 1.48 
ROA -0.08 -1.71*  -0.09 -1.67* 
MBV -0.07  -2.04**  -0.04 -2.28** 
BIG4 -0.04 -1.22  -0.05 -1.09 
ANA_FOL -0.03 -1.37  -0.04 -1.27 
Demographic Controls  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.53 0.53  0.46 0.46 
Observations 23164 23164  23164 23164 
Notes: We use *,**,*** in a two tailed test to respectively indicate statistical significance at 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent 
levels. We show co-efficient estimates and t-statistics in separate columns. SPITEM = income-decreasing special items scaled 
by sales, REVT is total revenue scaled by total assets. REL = religiosity of the firms’ environment, REL×SPITEM = interaction 
between religiosity and income-decreasing special items. REL× REVT = interaction between religiosity and total revenue 
scaled by total assets. SIZE is the natural log of total assets, LEV is the financial leverage measured as the total debts scaled 
by total equity, CASFO is the cash flow from operational activities scaled by lagged total assets. ROA is measured as net 
income before extraordinary items divided by average total assets and MBV is measured as total assets divided by market 
capitalization. BIG4 is an indicator variable that equals 1 if a firm is audited by the BIG4, otherwise zero and ANLYST_FOL 
represents the natural log of the number of financial analysts following the firm. The parameters are estimated based on the 
following model: All variables are defined in Appendix A. 
UNEXP_CE = β0 + + β1 SPITEM + β2REL + β3 SPITEM × REL +β4 REVT + β5 REVT × REL + β6 SIZE + β7 LEV + β8 
CASFO + β9 ROA + β10 BMV + β11 BIG4 + β12 ANALYST_FOL + Demographic Control Variables + Year Fixed Effects 
+Industry Fixed Effects
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Table 7: Impact of Religion on Classification Shifting in Urban and Rural Areas  
 URBAN  RURAL 
Variables Coefficient t-values  Coefficient t-values 
Intercept -0.06 -0.70  -0.09 -0.47 
SPITEM 0.07 2.28**  0.04 2.69** 
REVT 0.15 3.62***  0.11 2.20** 
REL -0.12 -3.21***  -0.09 -3.01*** 
REL×SPITEM -0.13 -3.45***  -0.11 -3.17*** 
REL×REVT -0.14 -3.09***  -0.08 -2.27** 
SIZE -0.08 -2.32**  -0.05 -1.74* 
LEV 0.06 1.06  0.00 1.01 
CASFO 0.16 2.23**  0.08 2.18** 
ROA -0.06 -1.77*  -0.07 -1.75* 
MBV -0.06 -1.04  -0.05 -1.02 
BIG4 -0.03 -1.36  -0.02 -1.49 
ANAL_FOL -0.04 -1.26  -0.03 -1.09 
Demographic Controls  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.37 0.37  0.33 0.33 
Observations 18,124 18,124  4,253 4,253 
Notes: We use *,**,*** in a two tailed test to respectively indicate statistical significance at 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent 
levels. We show co-efficient estimates and t-statistics in separate columns. SPITEM = income-decreasing special items scaled 
by sales, REVT is total revenue scaled by total assets. REL = religiosity of the firms’ environment, REL×SPITEM = interaction 
between religiosity and income-decreasing special items. REL×REVT = interaction between religiosity and total revenue 
scaled by total assets. SIZE is the natural log of total assets, LEV is the financial leverage measured as the total debts scaled 
by total equity, CASFO is the cash flow from operational activities scaled by lagged total assets. ROA is measured as net 
income before extraordinary items divided by average total assets and MBV is measured as total assets divided by market 
capitalization. BIG4 is an indicator variable that equals 1 if a firm is audited by the BIG4, otherwise zero and ANLYST_FOL 
represents the log of the number of financial analysts following the firm. The parameters are estimated based on the following 
model: All variables are defined in Appendix A. 
 
UNEXP_CE = β0 + + β1 SPITEM + β2REL + β3 SPITEM × REL +β4 REVT + β5 REVT × REL + β6 SIZE + β7 
LEV + β8 CASFO + β9 ROA + β10 BMV + β11 BIG4 + β12 ANALYST_FOL + Demographic Control Variables + 
Year Fixed Effects +Industry Fixed Effects       
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Table 8: Regressions of Religion on Classification Shifting Using Geographic 
Centralised and Dispersed Segments Sub-samples 
 Centralised 
Segments 
 Dispersed 
 Segments 
Variables Coefficient t-values  Coefficient t-values 
Intercept -0.07   -0.71  -0.04 -0.83 
SPITEM 0.06 2.96***  0.04 2.82*** 
REVT 0.13 3.35***  0.10 2.09** 
REL -0.18 -4.29***  -0.12 -1.53 
REL×SPITEM -0.16 -3.42***  -0.09 -1.48 
REL×REVT -0.12 -3.92***  -0.07 -1.32 
SIZE -0.06 -2.36**  -0.04 -2.43** 
LEV 0.19 1.41  0.03  1.56 
CASFO 0.19 1.49  0.13 1.48 
ROA -0.07 -1.78*  -0.08 -1.72* 
MBV -0.09  -2.18**  -0.03 -2.32** 
BIG4 -0.05 -1.02  -0.05 -1.09 
ANA_FOL -0.04 -1.32  -0.04 -1.27 
Demographic Controls  Yes  Yes  Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.38 0.38  0.32 0.32 
Observations 18,623 18,623  4,541 4,541 
Notes: We use *,**,*** in a two tailed test to respectively indicate statistical significance at 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent 
levels. We show co-efficient estimates and t-statistics in separate columns. SPITEM = income-decreasing special items scaled 
by sales, REVT is total revenue scaled by total assets. REL = religiosity of the firms’ environment, REL×SPITEM = interaction 
between religiosity and income-decreasing special items. REL× REVT = interaction between religiosity and total revenue 
scaled by total assets. SIZE is the natural log of total assets, LEV is the financial leverage measured as the total debts scaled 
by total equity, CASFO is the cash flow from operational activities scaled by lagged total assets. ROA is measured as net 
income before extraordinary items divided by average total assets and MBV is measured as total assets divided by market 
capitalization. BIG4 is an indicator variable that equals 1 if a firm is audited by the BIG4, otherwise zero and ANLYST_FOL 
represents the natural log of the number of financial analysts following the firm. The parameters are estimated based on the 
following model: All variables are defined in appendix A. 
 
  UNEXP_CE = β0 + + β1 SPITEM + β2REL + β3 SPITEM × REL +β4 REVT + β5 REVT × REL + β6 SIZE + β7 LEV + β8 
CASFO + β9 ROA + β10 BMV + β11 BIG4 + β12 ANALYST_FOL  +Demographic Control Variables + Year Fixed Effects + 
Industry Fixed Effects 
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Table 12: Religiosity and Misclassification in Pre and Post Sarbanes Oxley Act (2002)  
and Financial Crisis Periods 
Variables  2000-2002  2003-2006   2007-2009 2010-2015  
 Coefficient t-values Coefficient t-values Coefficient t-values Coefficient t-values 
Intercept -0.05 -0.72 -0.04 -0.74 -0.06 -0.77 -0.04 -0.64 
SPITEM 0.32 4.52*** 0.17 2.44** 0.49 6.48*** 0.18 2.34** 
REVT 0.19 3.98*** 0.14 2.37* 0.23 5.29*** 0.12 2.18*** 
REL -0.26 -3.52*** -0.25 -2.28** -0.31 -3.83*** -0.27 -3.66*** 
REL×SPITEM -0.17 -3.64*** -0.20 -2.42** -0.25 -3.79*** -0.20 -3.87*** 
REL×REVT -0.07 -3.26*** -0.07 -2.56** -0.14 -3.58*** -0.09 -3.91*** 
SIZE -0.03 -1.32 -0.02 -1.03 -0.06 -1.39 -0.02 -1.12 
LEV 0.06 2.35** 0.04 2.24** 0.09 3.56*** 0.04 2.26** 
CASFO 0.04 1.28 0.02 1.12 0.04 1.26 0.03 1.16 
ROA -0.06 -2.36** -0.03 -2.14** -0.09 -3.46*** -0.04 -2.18** 
MBV -0.01 -2.42** -0.02 -2.08** -0.08 -2.38** -0.06 -1.78* 
BIG4 -0.02 -1.49 -0.02 -1.20 -0.04 -1.53 -0.04 -1.28 
ANA_FOL -0.02 -1.63 -0.02 -1.44 -0.03 -1.49 -0.04 -1.44 
Demo. Controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed 
Effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed 
Effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 3,054 3,054 6,126 6,126 4,703 4,703 9,281 9,281 
Adjusted R2 0.29 0.29 0.31 0.31 0.29 0.29 0.30 0.30 
 
The study uses *, **, *** in a two-tailed test to respectively indicate statistical significance at 10, 5, and 1 percent levels. 
All variables are defined in Table 3. Coefficients and t-values are shown in separate columns. The parameters are 
estimated based on the following model: 
 UNEXP_CE = β0 + + β1 SPITEM + β2REL + β3 SPITEM × REL +β4 REVT + β5 REVT × REL + β6 SIZE + 
β7 LEV + β8 CASFO + β9 ROA + β10 BMV + β11 BIG4 + β12 ANALYST_FOL + Demographic Control 
Variables + Year Fixed Effects + Industry Fixed Effects   
